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STUCK IN OHIO’S LEGAL LIMBO, HOW MANY 
MISTRIALS ARE TOO MANY MISTRIALS?: 
EXPLORING NEW FACTORS THAT HELP A TRIAL 
JUDGE IN OHIO KNOW WHETHER TO EXERCISE 
HER AUTHORITY TO DISMISS AN INDICTMENT 
WITH PREJUDICE, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING 
REPEATED HUNG JURIES
SAMANTHA M. CIRA*
ABSTRACT
Multiple mistrials following validly prosecuted trials are becoming an increasingly 
harsh reality in today’s criminal justice system. Currently, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has not provided any guidelines to help its trial judges know when to make the crucial 
decision to dismiss an indictment with prejudice following a string of properly 
declared mistrials, especially due to repeated hung juries. Despite multiple mistrials 
that continue to result in no conviction, criminal defendants often languish behind 
bars, suffering detrimental psychological harm and a loss of personal freedom as they 
remain in “legal limbo” waiting to retry their case. Furthermore, continuously retrying 
defendants cuts against fundamental fairness and substantial justice highlighted in the 
“Ohio Due Course of Law” clause. This Note argues that Ohio trial judges need to 
apply a list of factors to avoid allegations of misconduct, to breathe life back into the 
defendant’s presumed innocence until proven guilty, and to guarantee prompt 
administration of justice. These factors include: (1) the number of prior mistrials and 
the circumstances of the jury deliberation therein, so far as is known; (2) the character 
of prior trials in terms of length, complexity, and similarity of evidence presented; (3) 
the likelihood of any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed; (4) 
whether the defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial, and the length of such 
incarceration; (5) the severity of the offense charged; (6) the professional conduct and 
diligence of respective counsel, particularly that of the prosecuting attorney; and (7) 
the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative case strength. Weighing these factors 
will promote stability, uniformity, and predictability among courts. Implementing 
factors will also help ensure that defendants are not pushed into taking unfair plea 
deals; it will aid appellate courts reviewing trial judges’ decisions whether or not to 
dismiss. Also, it will give legitimacy to the trial judges’ decisions. Overall, these 
factors will explore a fair balance between the prosecution’s right to seek a conviction 
and the rights of the accused, the victim, and the community at large.
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I. INTRODUCTION: AN OHIO DEFENDANT SUFFERS THROUGH MULTIPLE MISTRIALS
Ohio native Christopher Anderson has been incarcerated in the Mahoning County 
Jail for approximately 5,318 days without a lasting conviction.1 Fourteen years later, 
following four mistrials and a guilty verdict overturned and remanded on appeal, the 
State of Ohio intends to try Anderson again.2 Many defendants like Anderson, whom 
the law presumes innocent,3 find themselves in jail as they await trial and a possible 
conviction. “Collectively, today’s cohort of 3.3 million pretrial detainees will spend 
some 660 million days in pretrial detention.”4 Here in Ohio, Anderson is in jail 
awaiting his sixth trial with no concrete resolution.5 Are his constitutional rights 
violated by retrying him? Is fundamental fairness served here? At what point does a 
court in Ohio have to say stop and declare that enough is enough?6 How many mistrials 
are too many mistrials?
On September 14, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court held that no constitutional 
violation exists when the State seeks to retry Anderson after a string of properly 
declared mistrials.7 Based on this holding, Anderson will continue to sit in jail while 
both parties prepare for another trial, one where the State plans to introduce no new 
evidence and one that may likely end in another deadlocked jury.8 Anderson’s 
                                                          
1 Marianna Brown Bettman, What Happened on Remand: Christopher Anderson Is Out of 
Jail. State v. Anderson, LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO (Mar. 20, 2017), 
http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2017/03/what-happened-on-remand-christopher-
anderson-is-out-of-jail-state-v-anderson/ [hereinafter Bettman, What Happened on Remand].
2 Marianna Brown Bettman, What’s on Their Minds: How Many Times Can a Criminal 
Defendant Be Re-Tried? State of Ohio v. Christopher L. Anderson, LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO
(June 7, 2016), http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2016/06/whats-on-their-minds-how-
many-times-can-a-criminal-defendant-be-re-tried-state-of-ohio-v-christopher-l-anderson/ 
(summarizing the parties’ positions during oral arguments before the Supreme Court of Ohio 
on May 31, 2016).
3 Francois Quintard-Morenas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-
American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 149 (2010).
4 MARTIN SCHÖNTEICH, OPEN SOC. FOUND., PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE GLOBAL 
OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 1, 7 (2014) (exploring pretrial detention, which is “a terrible 
waste of human potential that comes at a considerable cost to states, taxpayers, families, and 
communities.”).
5 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790 (Ohio 2016).
6 Oral Argument at 20:11, State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790 (Ohio 2016) (No. 2015-1107), 
https://ohiochannel.org/video/case-no-2015-1107-state-v-anderson (noting that the Court is 
being asked to give an answer to that question). This Note looks for an answer to this question, 
exploring, in particular, the two mistrials during Anderson’s case that led to deadlocked juries. 
7 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 792. The Court reached its conclusion without giving proper 
weight to the fact that two of the trials resulted in hung juries because the prosecutor could not 
convince the jurors “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Instead, it focused solely on a double jeopardy 
analysis.
8 Id.; see Renico v. Lett , 559 U.S. 766, 788 (2010) (explaining that a jury is deadlocked 
when they cannot agree upon a verdict and are unable to reach the required unanimity); Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509–10 (1978) (explaining what a deadlocked jury is); Ramon 
Arce et al., In Search of Causes of Hung Juries, 6 EXPERT EVIDENCE 243, 244 (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers ed., 1999) (discussing Kalven and Zeisel’s 1966 prominent archival study 
about hung juries, which “revealed that the requirement of a unanimous verdict led to a hung 
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unrelenting imprisonment is puzzling, but his situation is not extraordinary. Although 
courts in Ohio have the inherent authority to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice,9
Ohio trial courts need factors to help exercise that authority to avoid this detrimental 
“legal limbo.”10 Trying Anderson for a sixth time following multiple mistrials is a 
miscarriage of justice, encouraging a dangerous precedent that cuts against 
Anderson’s constitutional rights and the rights of many other detainees sitting in “legal 
limbo” who are entitled to a presumption of innocence.11
Ohio should adopt factors to help trial judges exercise their inherent authority to 
dismiss and to help judges rethink what they consider to be punishment. These factors 
will ensure more predictability and consistency across cases confronting multiple 
mistrials, guaranteeing that similar cases receive the same treatment. Furthermore, the 
Ohio Supreme Court reached its decision in Anderson despite the clear language 
spelled out in the Ohio Constitution.12 The language in the Ohio Constitution affords 
more protection than the federal floor, allowing defendants like Anderson to hold due 
                                                          
jury in 5.6% of cases, this percentage fell to 3.1% when a 2/3 majority decision rule was 
required”).
9 See Ohio Crim. R. 48; RONALD B. ADRINE & ALEXANDRIA M. RUDEN, OHIO DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE LAW § 5:3 (2016).
10 Many individuals sit locked in prison for astonishing amounts of time waiting for a 
conviction that might not even come. See, e.g., Dana Sauchelli & Rebecca Rosenberg, Man
Arrested as Teen Has Waited 7 Years in Rikers for Trial, N.Y. POST (June 15, 2015), 
http://nypost.com/2015/06/15/kid-arrested-at-17-has-been-at-rikers-awaiting-trial-for-7-years 
(noting that in 2015, Manhattan detainee Carlos Montero spent his seventh year locked up in 
jail waiting for his very first trial). Montero’s incarceration demonstrates that “legal limbo” 
comes in all different forms. Some defendants sit in limbo waiting for their very first trial while 
others experience the detriments of limbo waiting for multiple trials, languishing behind bars 
while thier attorneys prepare for their trials.
Other defendants experience psychological harms from incarceration. Kalief Browder’s 
incarceration demonstrates the devastating effect of psychological harm that follows a 
defendant even after they leave this “legal limbo.” See Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, 
Man Held at Rikers Jail for 3 Years Without Trial Commits Suicide at 22, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2015, at A20; Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014, at 26 (noting 
that the State accused Browder of taking a backpack, and the courts took three years of his life).
Case law also highlights this danger. See, e.g., State v. Fitzpatrick, 772 A.2d 1093, 1097–98 
(Vt. 2001). For instance, Vermont resident Paul Fitzpatrick was tried before two juries, both of 
which became deadlocked. Id. at 1098 (“[T]he number of hung juries is not determinative, but 
it is an important factor.”). Similarly, in Summit County, Ohio, Michael Roper’s trials ended in 
three hung juries before a jury convicted him in 2002. State v. Roper, No. 20836, 2002 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 7191, 2002 WL 31890116, at ¶¶ 73–74 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (“[T]here 
is a point at which repeated mistrials will violate an accused’s right to due process, and he 
[Appellant] contends that the point was reached in the present case after the third mistrial.”).
11 See SCHÖNTEICH, supra note 4 (noting that on an average day “3.3 million people are in 
pretrial detention . . . although they should be presumed innocent, pretrial detainees are often 
held in conditions worse than those of sentenced prisoners”).
12 E.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 1–2, 10, 16. For instance, “[n]o person shall be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.” Id. § 10. And “every person . . . shall have justice administered 
without denial or delay.” Id. § 16.
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process rights to “justice administered without denial or delay.”13 Based on these 
words, defendants, their victims, and the community at large are entitled to the prompt 
administration of justice.14 If trial judges do not take steps to consider when enough is 
enough to promptly administer justice, their failure to act could be attacked as judicial 
misconduct. Accordingly, Ohio trial courts need to establish guidelines to avoid these 
accusations. Moreover, while many of these detainees continue to sit in jail, they face 
challenges that amount to and may cause lasting psychological harm and the 
disintegration of the presumption of innocence.15 To avoid these detrimental problems, 
implementing factors will also ensure that defendants do not feel forced to take plea 
deals, will aid appellate courts reviewing the trial judge’s decisions, and, therefore, 
will give legitimacy to the trial judges’ decisions.
Part II of this Note provides background on Anderson, including a synthesis of the 
law in Ohio and other states regarding a trial court’s discretion to dismiss an 
indictment with prejudice following multiple mistrials, especially after hung juries. 
This part also explores resulting harms from pretrial incarceration and post-trial 
incarceration. Finally, this section explores Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause16 in 
relation to the Federal Due Process Clause17 and provides a short history of a 
defendant’s right to be presumed innocent.
Part III will confront the law and analyze it, arguing that the Ohio Constitution can 
afford to give greater protections than the United States Constitution to a detainee’s 
due process rights. Additionally, this part will explore the possibility that multiple 
mistrials slowly erode the defendants’ right to be presumed innocent, resulting in 
lasting harm.
Part IV will suggest new factors—that stem from strong precedent in other states—
for Ohio to apply when addressing this issue in the future.18 These factors will include: 
1) the number of prior mistrials and the circumstances of the jury 
deliberation therein, so far as is known; 
2) the character of prior trials in terms of length, complexity, and similarity 
of evidence presented; 
3) the likelihood of any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if 
allowed; 
4) whether the defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial, and the 
length of such incarceration;
                                                          
13 Id. § 16. Many other states use similar language. E.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“[H]ave 
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”). 
My proposed factors for Ohio trial courts will account for a defendant’s due process rights and 
will ultimately serve all case parties’ interests.
14 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; see State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1978).
15 See, e.g., David Post, Opinion, Guilty Until Innocent, in Colorado, WASH. POST (Nov. 
21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/21/guilty-
until-proven-innocent-in-colorado/?utm_term=.b825e7212c35 (noting that “all people brought 
before a tribunal ‘are taken, prima facie, i.e., in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be 
good, honest, and free from blame . . . .’”).
16 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 See Part IV infra.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
186 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:181
5) the severity of the offense charged; 
6) the professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel, 
particularly that of the prosecuting attorney; and
7) the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative case strength.19
These factors will benefit all parties in a case and will help to avoid allegations of 
judicial misconduct. This guidance will also encourage Ohio trial courts to guarantee 
that juries are provided with the proper tools they need to reach a fair conclusion, 
ensuring the prompt administration of justice and uniformity across cases. 
Part V concludes by arguing that Ohio trial courts need to adopt these new factors 
so that judges know when to properly exercise their inherent authority to dismiss a 
case or to permit prosecutors to continue to pursue a conviction after multiple 
mistrials.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ohio Supreme Court Mistakenly Declines to Follow Other Case Law 
Discussing Retrials, Especially After Deadlocked Juries
1. Facts of Anderson
On June 3, 2002, police found Amber Zurcher dead in her apartment in Austintown 
Township in Mahoning County, Ohio.20 The police arrested Christopher Anderson two
months after the murder; the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted him for Amber’s 
murder.21 Before his first trial on May 27, 2003, the prosecution attempted to enter 
into evidence testimony “regarding a prior incident in which Anderson allegedly had 
bitten and choked another woman” named Donna Dripps.22 However, the trial judge 
sustained a pretrial defense motion to exclude her testimony as prejudicial.23 Despite 
this ruling, while on the stand, Amber’s friend, Nichole Ripple, “blurted out . . . 
Dripps’s claim under the guise of a statement made by Amber.”24 The news media 
drew their undivided attention to this statement; the following day, the trial judge 
declared a mistrial.25 The trial court convicted Anderson at his second trial, but the 
                                                          
19 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982); State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232, 
236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980).
20 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 792–93 (Ohio 2016). The police could find no signs 
of forced entry into Amber’s apartment. The night before her murder, Amber invited several 
friends, including Anderson, to her apartment for an “after hours” party. At the apartment, the 
group drank, smoked marijuana, and tried to “score” cocaine. Although Anderson was among 
the last to leave the party, it is undisputed that John Orosz ensured that he locked the door when 
he left with Anderson. Both Anderson and his mother informed the police that Anderson had 
come home after the party. Anderson has remained set in his belief that he is not guilty. Id.
21 Id.
22 Merit Br. of Appellant Christopher L. Anderson, at *2–3, State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 
790 (Ohio 2016) (2015-1107) (Feb. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Merit Br.]. Ms. Dripps claimed that 
more than a year before Amber’s murder, Anderson had choked Dripps and bitten her breast. 
Id.
23 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 793.
24 Id.; Merit Br., supra note 22, at *3.
25 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 793. It can be noted that many of these cases ending in mistrials 
due to hung juries include celebrated, high profile cases. Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White 
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court 
because of erroneous evidentiary rulings.26 In December 2008, at Anderson’s third 
trial, the judge declared a mistrial because the jury could not reach a fair decision.27
The State’s fourth effort to convict Anderson in April 2010 also resulted in a mistrial 
based on attorney and juror misconduct.28 Finally, the State’s fifth attempt to convict 
Anderson resulted in a second hopelessly deadlocked jury and ended in another 
mistrial.29
In early 2016, the State announced its decision to prosecute Anderson for a sixth 
time.30 Consequently, Anderson filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.31 On 
September 14, 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the State’s sixth attempt 
at prosecution did not violate any of Anderson’s constitutional rights or the rights of 
similar detainees.32 Thus, the prosecution may proceed in the indictment despite five 
previous prosecutions spanning almost fourteen years.
2. Case Law Holds That the Trial Court May Dismiss Indictments with Prejudice 
Following Deadlocked Juries
Unlike the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Anderson, courts in surrounding 
jurisdictions have held that various factors can help a trial court exercise its authority 
to dismiss an indictment with prejudice following mistrials caused by hung juries, 
                                                          
Berch, The Power of the Judiciary to Dismiss Criminal Charges After Several Hung Juries: A 
Proposed Rule to Control Judicial Discretion, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 535, 536 n.13 (1997) 
(proposing a rule for the federal legislature to apply).
26 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *5–6. At Anderson’s second trial, the State presented 
inconclusive DNA evidence and testimony that proved ineffective from all the party’s attendees. 
The trial judge also reversed its previous ruling and allowed Ms. Dripps to testify. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that Ms. Dripps’s testimony was “by and large irrelevant,” giving the
appearance that Anderson “was being tried for attacking Donna Dripps in addition to being tried 
for the murder of Amber Zurcher.” The trial judge also allowed Anderson’s probation officer 
to testify about Anderson’s probation violations. The Court of Appeals also labeled this 
evidence as “extensive, largely irrelevant, and highly prejudicial.” Id.
27 Id. at *7; see Karen Pelletier O’Sullivan, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 
ME. L. REV. 167 (1985) (explaining that juries have three alternatives when a unanimous verdict 
is required: a guilty verdict, a not guilty verdict, or no verdict for lack of unanimity (citing 
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969)).
28 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *5–7. The judge declared a mistrial when one of the jurors 
spoke out after he observed Anderson’s co-counsel asleep during voir dire. Id.
29 Id. Here, it is important to note that the State offered no new evidence at trial. Id.
30 Id. at *8.
31 Id. at *8–10. The trial judge overruled the motion to dismiss on February 15, 2011, and 
Anderson appealed. The Ohio Supreme Court eventually rejected the trial judge’s decision, 
which had said that Anderson’s appeal of the judge’s overruling of a motion to dismiss was not 
a final appealable order. On remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s overruling of 
the motion to dismiss. The Ohio Supreme Court again accepted jurisdiction after Anderson 
appealed. Clearly, some of the delay during Anderson’s case occurred as this motion moved 
through the hierarchy of courts. Id. Yet, it seems to be no surprise that Anderson would have 
filed a motion to dismiss at this point.
32 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ohio 2016).
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especially after finding that further prosecution would infringe on a defendant’s right 
to fundamental fairness and substantial justice.33 Examples in State v. Witt and United 
States v. Ingram strongly suggest ending a prosecution if it appears that substantially 
the same evidence will be presented at future trials and if there is a great probability 
of continued hung juries.34 The bounds of duly exercised discretion limit this 
authority;35 the trial court must balance “two basic rights: a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial and the State’s right to seek a verdict on validly prosecuted charges.”36 However, 
“[t]his right of the State to retry a defendant when the jury could not agree could not 
be abused.”37 Overall, these cases suggest that using factors can guide a trial judge’s 
decision on whether to dismiss indictments with prejudice, especially after a hung 
jury.38
3. Ohio Recognizes No Factors to Apply When Trial Courts Confront This Issue
Although no courts have been able to identify a specific number of hung juries that 
would warrant dismissal,39 many state courts have held that the trial court is in the best 
position to weigh relevant factors to determine if dismissing an indictment with
prejudice is possible.40 Yet, Ohio courts recognize no factors of their own to consult 
for guidance when deciding whether to exercise their inherent authority to dismiss;41
the Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson did not adopt any factors for Ohio courts to 
consistently apply in the future.42
                                                          
33 See, e.g., Sivels v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1197, 1198 (Ind. 2001) (stating that the grand jury 
indicted Sivels for murder, felony murder, and robbery); State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 518 
(N.J. 1985) (“Fundamental fairness can be viewed as an integral part of the right to due 
process.”); but see State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1168–69 (Vt. 1995) (holding that courts 
ordinarily must defer to the prosecutor’s decision to retry the case in the absence of a violation 
of fundamental fairness).
34 State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978); see United States v. Ingram, 412 F. 
Supp. 384, 385 (1976) (reasoning that prosecutors cannot keep pressing in hopes that conviction 
eventually will result when they had no new proof).
35 See, e.g., State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 711 (Haw. 1982) (“[T]rial courts have the 
power to dismiss . . . .”).
36 State v. Cordova, 993 P.2d 104, 108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting the opposing side’s 
argument).
37 Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681, 685–86 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (noting that the right 
of the State to retry a defendant is one which must be weighed in the surrounding circumstances 
of the particular situation involved).
38 Approximately sixteen states permit trial judges to consider factors when determining 
whether or not to dismiss an indictment with prejudice. It is my goal to suggest that Ohio needs 
to follow in these courts’ footsteps and confront this issue head on.
39 See Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 917 (“This opinion is not to be construed as fixing the 
permissible or impermissible number of mistrials caused by deadlocked juries.”).
40 See, e.g., State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982) (providing a list of six 
factors for courts to balance).
41 See State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 796 (Ohio 2016) (“We categorically reject the . . 
. factors that that court applied in this case . . . .”).
42 Though the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to analyze factors, the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not support their analysis, and they refused to recognize any factors. Id.;
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Back in 2002, Ohio’s Ninth Circuit in State v. Roper grappled with a case where 
the jury convicted a defendant of aggravated murder after three mistrials; however, 
the court had to look to other states for direction in the analysis.43 Most importantly, 
the court reviewed case law from Hawaii and Iowa.44 Hawaii’s factors when deciding 
whether to dismiss an indictment with prejudice include:
1) the severity of the offense charged;
2) the number of prior mistrials and the circumstances of the jury 
deliberation therein, so far as is known;
3) the character of prior trials in terms of length, complexity and similarity 
of evidence presented;
4) the likelihood of any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if 
allowed;
5) the trial court's own evaluation of the relative case strength; and
6) the professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel, 
particularly that of the prosecuting attorney.45
Similarly, Iowa’s factors laid out in an Iowa Court of Appeals include:
1) weight of the evidence of guilt or innocence;
2) nature of the crime involved;
3) whether defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial;
4) whether defendant has been sentenced in a related or similar case;
5) length of such incarceration;
6) possibility of harassment;
7) likelihood of new or additional evidence at trial;
8) effect on the protection to society in case the defendant should actually 
be guilty;
9) probability of greater incarceration upon conviction of another offense;
10)defendant’s prior record;
11)the purpose and effect of further punishment; and
12)any prejudice resulting to defendant by the passage of time.46
                                                          
State v. Anderson, No. 11 MA 43, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 1956, 2015 WL 3409047, at ¶ 22 
(Ohio Ct. App. May 20, 2015).
43 State v. Roper, No. 20836, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7191, 2002 WL 31890116, at ¶ 87  
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002).
44 Id. at ¶ 84 (noting that both parties asked the court to consider factors while making its 
decision).
45 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982).
46 State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232, 235–36 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980). Though only Hawaii’s 
and Iowa’s factors are listed here, many other courts have identified similar factors that a trial 
court should weigh to form an appropriate basis for determining whether to dismiss a 
defendant’s indictment after multiple prosecutions caused by mistrials. Some of these other 
courts adopt Hawaii’s and Iowa’s factors word for word while others have adopted a variation. 
See, e.g., State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Vt. 1995) (“[W]here relevant, the trial court 
should consider such factors, which weigh the respective interests of the defendant, the 
complainant, and the community at large.”); State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 522 (N.J. 1985) 
(“[W]e do not undertake to define all the circumstances in which it would be proper to order a 
dismissal, just as it is infeasible to suggest which factors would be weightier . . . . The decision 
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The Roper court noted that these considerations should be weighed in furtherance of 
justice.47 Furthermore, the Ohio Tenth Circuit applied Moriwake’s and Lundeen’s 
factors in State v. Whiteside, a decision to retry a defendant charged with aggravated 
murder for a third time after two hung juries.48 Similarly, in State v. Dickerson in 
Ohio’s Fourth District, Vincent Dickerson also cited Moriwake when arguing for 
dismissal with prejudice for violating his due process rights after his two aggravated 
murder trials also ended in hung juries.49
B. The Ohio “Due Course of Law” Clause and the Federal “Due Process” Clause
Originally drafted in 1851 and amended in 1912, Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution declares, “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”50 This clause applies 
fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding and protects Ohio’s citizens, including 
detainees like Anderson, against arbitrary actions by the government.51 Since 1893, 
the phrase “due course of law” embedded within Section 16 has been viewed as being 
equivalent to the “due process of law” language in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.52 Although Ohio’s Constitution uses slightly different 
language when it emphasizes justice to citizens that cannot be denied or delayed, the 
                                                          
is left to the sound judgment of our trial courts to be exercised in the unique circumstances 
arising in such cases.”); People v. Verducci, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, 916–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
Generally, the state courts that have considered factors for trial courts to weigh in deciding 
whether to dismiss an indictment with prejudice in this situation include Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 
No. CR96-0122715T, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2297, 1998 WL 525449, at *2 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 13, 1998); see generally Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 708; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 235. 
Though not all 50 states have recognized such factors, the list of states mentioned above makes 
clear that since 1980 when the Lundeen court recognized factors and 1982 when the Moriwake
court added their own, this list of states will continue to grow over time. Ohio should be added 
to the list.
47 Roper, No. 20836, at ¶¶ 75, 77 (“Ohio has recognized the authority of a trial judge to 
dismiss a case in the interest of justice.”); see State v. Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125, 1127–28 (Ohio 
1996).
48 State v. Whiteside, No. 08AP-602, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1652, 2009 WL 1099435, at 
¶¶ 12, 21 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009) (holding that, after weighing the relevant factors, the 
prosecution may retry the defendant a third time). Even though the Whiteside court chose to 
retry the defendant, the factors brought stability to the Court’s consideration.
49 State v. Dickerson, No. 1277, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8149, 1986 WL 8797, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1986).
50 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
51 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 795 (Ohio 2016).
52 Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ohio 1941); see Wilson 
v. City of Zanesville, 199 N.E. 187, 189 (Ohio 1935) (stating that the words “due course of law” 
are equivalent in meaning to “due process of law”), overruled by City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 
49 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 1943).
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Ohio Supreme Court often still quotes United States Supreme Court decisions on the 
true meaning of the Ohio Bill of Rights guarantees.53
Despite these clauses’ similarities, the Ohio Supreme Court held in Arnold v. 
Cleveland that “[a]s long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the 
United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the Federal Bill of 
Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections 
to individuals and groups.”54 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court is free to provide its 
citizens with greater protections under its own Constitution than afforded to its citizens 
under the Federal Constitution.55 The Ohio Supreme Court has been open and 
receptive to this construction in recent years, holding that the Ohio Constitution 
provides enhanced protections in various cases.56 Notably, even if the Ohio Supreme 
Court previously has discussed provisions in the Federal and Ohio Constitutions 
jointly, it does not need to “irreversibly tie [itself]” to an old interpretation of the Ohio 
Constitution’s language because it is consistent with the Federal Constitution’s 
language.57 Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court is free to read Article I, Section 16 more 
broadly than it reads the Federal Constitution to provide defendants like Anderson 
more constitutional protections.58
                                                          
53 In re Adoption of H.N.R., 47 N.E.3d 803, 809 (Ohio 2015) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides that the state shall not deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. Though it uses slightly different language, 
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides the same guarantee.” (first citing U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; then citing OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16)); see State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 862, 
883 (Ohio 2016) (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (quoting Dowling v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)) (“‘[B]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.’”).
54 Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 168–69 (Ohio 1993) (holding that a Cleveland 
ordinance was a reasonable exercise of police power). Arnold distinguishes state protections 
from federal protections.
55 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 799 (Lanzinger, J., concurring) (“[T]he Ohio Constitution can 
indeed provide due-process protection that exceeds that which is provided by the United States 
Constitution.”).
56 See In re A.G., 69 N.E.3d 646, 651 (Ohio 2016) (stating that the Court is open to the idea 
that Ohio juveniles receive double-jeopardy protections in the Ohio Constitution that go beyond 
those in the Federal Constitution); see also Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044–45 
(Ohio 2000) (clarifying that the Ohio Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause grants broader 
protections to Ohio’s citizens than the Federal Constitution affords).
57 State v. Mole, 74 N.E.3d 368, 375 (Ohio 2016) (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 
N.E.2d 203, 211–22 (Ohio 1999)); cf. State v. Farris, 849 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio 2006) (holding that 
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection to criminal defendants 
than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution); State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 
177 (Ohio 2003) (holding that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution “provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against warrantless 
arrests for minor misdemeanors”).
58 Mole, 74 N.E.3d at 375. While the opposing side may argue that the federal floor trumps 
states’ wishes, it appears that other state courts are also increasingly relying more on their own 
constitutions when examining personal rights and liberties. See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 
S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992) (“With a strongly independent state judiciary, Texas should borrow 
from well-reasoned and persuasive federal . . . precedent when this is deemed helpful, but should 
never feel compelled to parrot the federal judiciary.”); State v. Johnson, 345 A.2d 66, 67 (N.J. 
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Despite Ohio’s freedom to provide greater due process protection than what stems 
from the Federal Constitution, the Anderson court focused on whether retrying 
Anderson violated double jeopardy—though double jeopardy does not properly apply 
to his facts because the court confronted multiple mistrials.59 Ohio follows the United 
States Supreme Court; Ohio courts consistently refuse to separately consider 
substantive due process when they believe a more specific provision of the 
Constitution applies.60 Therefore, when a defendant like Anderson asserted that 
multiple trials offend the Constitution’s due process protections, the Ohio Supreme 
Court determined in Anderson that raising a generalized due process claim in defense 
to multiple mistrials “is nothing more than [the] double-jeopardy claim in different 
clothing.”61 Thus, “[g]overnment action violates due process only if it offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”62 Anderson clearly lost some fundamental principles of 
justice in the fourteen years that he remained in jail following his five mistrials. Yet, 
the Ohio Supreme Court remained committed to analyzing its Constitution in 
connection with the Federal Constitution and believed that Anderson’s situation only 
warranted a discussion on double jeopardy.
C. Change in the Historical Understanding of the Presumption of Innocence
A concept originally embedded in a defendant’s constitutional right to due process 
says “[e]very person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution.”63
Historically in the United States, this age-old adage called the “presumption of 
innocence” found its roots in due process and English common law, requiring “a legal 
determination at trial to punish a defendant for a crime.”64 Given that guilt was not 
                                                          
1975) (“[E]ach state has the power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures under 
state law than is required under the Federal Constitution.”); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—And 
Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 176 (2009) (“[T]he 
individual-rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights were based on pre-existing state constitutional 
guarantees, not the other way around.”). Because other states are studying their own 
constitutions more closely, Ohio can do the same.
59 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 795.
60 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997); Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 799 
(Lazinger, J., concurring).
61 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 796 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause deals specifically with the 
issue whether a defendant may be retried after a trial court has declared a mistrial.”); see When 
Defendant Challenges His Retrial, Double Jeopardy Clause Controls over More General Due 
Process Clause, 33 Crim. L. News NL (West) No. 21, at 12 (2016) (“When a defendant 
challenges his or her retrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause controls over the Due Process 
Clause.”). The opposing side supports a double jeopardy analysis. However, the opposing side 
fails to recognize the important constitutional protections afforded by the due process clause, so 
Anderson can be distinguished from opposing cases.
62 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977). The Anderson court determined that 
this standard was not met. Also, they rank due process as an inferior constitutional protection.
63 OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.05(A) (2017).
64 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 727 
n.17 (2011) (“The concept of the presumption of innocence is not a modern development, and 
is common to many ancient legal systems.”); see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 
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determined until trial, one of the most striking protections that stemmed from the 
presumption of innocence was the constitutional right to pretrial release through bail.65
Therefore, the presumption of innocence carried an important meaning.66
Starting in the 1960s, courts began to consider new factors before trial, including 
the weight of the evidence against a defendant and how his release would impact the 
community’s safety.67 These factors allowed judges to make predictions about 
defendants’ guilt to ensure that criminals remained behind bars.68 Furthermore, “[o]ver 
time, courts separated due process from the presumption of innocence.”69 Separating 
these two concepts helped to mold the courts’ current view of the presumption of 
innocence—a presumption, which all too often, does not apply in the pretrial phase.
                                                          
(1895) (tracing the presumption of innocence from Deuteronomy and ancient Greek and Roman 
law); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485–86 (1978) (“Due process clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards against dilution of principle that guilt is to be established by 
probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W. 
359, 361 (Ky. 1903) (holding that punishment without evidence of guilt should not occur, and 
in this case the court should have instructed the jury to find the defendant not guilty).
65 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to pretrial 
release until proven guilty as the spirit of bail is to “enable [the defendant] to stay out of jail 
until a trial has found them guilty”); Baradaran, supra note 64, at 733 (“Under U.S. law, the 
purpose of bail was to ensure the appearance of defendant to ‘submit to a trial, and the judgment 
of the court’ and not for preventing future crimes.”).
66 Baradaran, supra note 64, at 737 n.75 (quoting United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 
539 (2d Cir. 1997)):
Unless and until the Government meets its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the presumption of innocence remains with the accused regardless of the fact that he 
has been charged with the crime, regardless of what is said about him at trial, regardless 
of whether the jurors believe that he is likely guilty, regardless of whether he is actually 
guilty. The presumption attaches to those who are actually innocent and to those who 
are actually guilty alike throughout all stages of the trial and deliberations unless and 
until that burden is met.
Id. This important meaning allowed a defendant to avoid suffering harm in jail while awaiting 
conviction.
67 Baradaran, supra note 64, at 738 n.83 (citing United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (holding that preventive detention is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) only if 
one of the conditions listed in that section is met)). Furthermore, the 1984 Bail Reform Act 
“allows the judge to conduct an abbreviated mini-trial to determine whether the defendant is 
guilty and whether she is likely to commit a crime while on release.” Id. at 753.
68 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (paving the way for pretrial detainees to be 
treated like convicts and discounting the application of the presumption of innocence); but see
Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Benjamin Vaughan, (Mar. 14, 1785), 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=42&page=712 (“That it is better 100 
guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer, is a Maxim that has 
been long . . . approved . . . .”).
69 Baradaran, supra note 64, at 758 (“From the 1960s on, the determination of guilt by a 
judge pretrial, before the chance for a fair trial, was not generally found to violate due process.”).
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D. Lasting Harm Results from Extended Detainment Waiting for Trials
As prosecutors continue to seek convictions, many defendants awaiting multiple 
trials cannot afford to return to the community; accordingly, an estimated 60.2% of 
the nation’s jail population are detainees awaiting trial.70 In 2010, the Ohio Department 
of Rehabilitation and Correction had nearly $1.27 billion in jail and prison 
expenditures with an average annual cost per inmate of $25,814 for inmates awaiting 
trial.71 Though many of these inmates have not yet been convicted of any crime, they 
can be held alongside the ten percent of convicted offenders who are housed in jails 
rather than prisons, further blurring the lines between these two settings.72 These 
detainees also suffer anxiety and exhaustion as their future continually remains 
uncertain.73 Some commentators raise a compelling safety argument: remaining in 
prison hampers an anxiety-ridden defendant’s ability to advocate to the court that he 
can successfully return to the community and prevents easy access to his 
representation.74
Further, negative psychological impacts often serve as a straining side effect of 
pretrial incarceration, stemming from factors such as a loss of security, distance from 
family and friends, exposure to deplorable conditions, and threats of violence in jail.75
                                                          
70 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & Sixth 
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1310 (2012) (“Nationally, taxpayers spend $9 
billion annually to incarcerate defendants held on bail.”); see generally Samuel R. Wiseman, 
Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (“[Detainees] cannot 
work during the often considerable time that they spend in jail—leaving any children and other 
dependents to fend for themselves—and their jobs may not be waiting . . . .”).
71 CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF 
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 10 (2012). This money is spent while many 
defendants sit in jail awaiting trial.
72 Appleman, supra note 70, at 1320–21.
73 See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 1297, 1307 (2000):
One psychiatrist, while cautioning that not all falsely arrested people suffer serious 
effects, nonetheless concluded that false charges and pre-trial incarceration can lead to 
dissociative disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders, adjustment disorders, dysthymic 
disorders, and generalized anxiety disorders. Another professor of psychiatry was more 
skeptical, concluding that many claims of psychiatric problems following a wrongful 
arrest are exaggerated. But despite these doubts, the professor acknowledged that many 
of the former suspects “expressed great anger and resentment, some of which extended 
to feelings of retribution and revenge” at what had occurred, emotions the psychiatrist 
found quite reasonable, especially given the “stressful, onerous, unpleasant, costly, and 
humiliating experience” of being put through the criminal system.
Id.
74 See Douglas J. Klein, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and the Cure, 52 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 294 (1997) (“Because of overcrowding, prisoners, 
including pretrial detainees, may be incarcerated in facilities far away from the district in which 
they are tried. This distance can inhibit a defense attorney from consulting with the pretrial 
detainee.”).
75 Appleman, supra note 70, at 1318–20 (describing the “unquestionable harm” offenders 
who are incarcerated pretrial suffer).
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These factors often compel a defendant to plead guilty immediately and give up her 
right to trial.76 Ohio courts need a solution because the aggravating factors associated 
with pretrial incarceration and—what this Note refers to as “post-trial 
incarceration”—during multiple mistrials.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Retrial After Multiple Mistrials Resulting from Hung Juries Violates the
Ohio Due Course of Law Clause
The Ohio Supreme Court should recognize factors for trial courts to consult for 
guidance in deciding whether a court may dismiss a case with prejudice.77 These 
factors would enforce enhanced due process protections contained within Article I, 
Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution for defendants who have endured multiple 
mistrials after hung juries.78 While many courts like Anderson argue that sweeping 
aside the due process claim for a double jeopardy analysis is correct, this section aims 
to highlight the problems behind multiple mistrials through a due process lens and 
shine light on a trial judge’s crucial role in the process.
1. Breaking Down the Ohio Due Course of Law Clause When the State Is a Sore 
Loser
A defendant’s due process rights are negatively impacted if the State cannot 
succeed after multiple attempts at prosecution. Ohio courts should re-examine the 
holding in Arnold to give greater due process protections to Ohio’s citizens who are, 
and have been, subject to multiple mistrials with no valid conviction.79 Arnold held 
that the Ohio Constitution, a document of independent force, can give greater 
protections to individuals and groups than the Federal Constitution requires.80 Despite 
Arnold’s holding, the Anderson court refused to recognize greater due process 
protections for defendants subject to multiple mistrials; instead, the court only 
examined double jeopardy implications.81 However, cases with defendants similar to 
Anderson do not offend double jeopardy, as juries neither convict or acquit such 
defendants; therefore, Anderson mistakenly pushes future courts to keep analyzing 
double jeopardy without considering the importance of due process protections.82
                                                          
76 Id. at 1320 (“The prospect of being incarcerated, even for a short time, can look ruinous 
to poor defendants, as this often means the loss of their livelihood, severe disruptions to their 
family lives, or both.”).
77 These factors described in Part IV infra will serve as the desperately needed solution I 
referred to at the end of Part II supra.
78 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. I do encourage Ohio trial courts to use the factors in situations 
beyond hung juries.
79 Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (“The recent movement by state 
courts to rely on their constitutions, rather than on the federal Constitution, has been labeled 
‘state constitutionalism’ or ‘new federalism.’ This movement has met with considerable 
approval.”).
80 Id.
81 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 795 (Ohio 2016).
82 Id. at 799–800 (Lanzinger, J., concurring).
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Critics of a due process analysis erroneously follow the Anderson majority’s view of 
multiple mistrials, holding that a defendant’s multiple mistrials do not offend notions 
of justice.83 Following Anderson, these critics continue to believe that courts should 
hastily push aside a due process challenge in favor of a double jeopardy analysis.84
Examining double jeopardy will automatically permit a judge to order a new trial after 
a properly declared mistrial did not result in a conviction, regardless of the 
circumstances of the case.85 Anderson correctly pointed out that double jeopardy does 
not attach when the trial court properly declares a mistrial.86 However, as Justice 
Lanzinger recognized in her concurrence in Anderson, why should the analysis stop 
there?
The Anderson majority failed to consider Arnold’s implications and would not 
move beyond the Double Jeopardy Clause analysis, because the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is “more specific” than the general Due Process Clause.87 However, by solely 
focusing on the Double Jeopardy Clause, a clause that courts have held inapplicable 
to multiple mistrials,88 the Court swept Anderson’s due process rights away, denying 
Ohioans “justice administered without denial or delay.”89 These words embedded 
within the Ohio Due Course of Law Clause highlight protections that go beyond the 
Fourteenth Amendment because many mistrials delay the administration of justice to 
                                                          
83 Id.
84 State v. Lovejoy, 683 N.E.2d 1112, 1116–17 (Ohio 1997) (finding that the State may 
retry a defendant after the trial court declared a mistrial). Thus, it has been proven that multiple 
mistrials do not offend double jeopardy because no conviction or acquittal resulted; yet, this 
analysis seems incomplete.
85 See Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 790; compare Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 123 
(2003); with Morris Reid Estes, Criminal Law and Procedure—Double Jeopardy—Trial 
Judge’s Discretionary Power to Dismiss in Hung Jury Situations, State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913 
(Tenn. 1978), 47 TENN. L. REV. 198, 198 (1979) (“Determining the point at which the 
government is prohibited from further inflicting the burden of trial upon an accused who has 
already undergone successive prosecutions that have ended in deadlocked juries tests the 
measure of protection afforded by the fifth amendment’s double jeopardy clause.”).
86 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 796–97; see Double Jeopardy Clause is Not Offended When State 
Seeks to Retry Defendant After Series of Properly Declared Mistrials, 33 Crim. L. News NL 
(West) No. 21, at 13 (2016) (“[W]hile the Supreme Court was deeply troubled that a final 
resolution in this case had not been reached, there was no prohibition in the federal or state 
Double Jeopardy Clauses that barred the defendant’s retrial after several mistrials had been 
declared.”).
87 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 796.
88 E.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); see, e.g., GA. CONST. 1983, art. I, § I, 
¶ XVIII. (The Georgia Constitution expressly excepts the grant of mistrials from 
constituting double jeopardy); see generally Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, 15 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 169 (1977).
89 OHIO CONST. art. I, §16; Merit Br., supra note 22, at *15–16 (“[W]hile Double Jeopardy 
may not prevent retrial after retrial . . . the right to have justice administered without denial or 
delay cannot suffer as a result of such continued attempts to convict.”); but see United States v. 
Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824) (holding that an accused could be reprosecuted consistently with 
the double jeopardy provision if the judge determined that it was manifestly necessary to 
discharge the jury prior to a verdict).
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the victims and their families.90 After these mistrials, courts can rightly assume that 
another attempt at prosecution would end in more deadlocked juries, lead to an 
acquittal, or produce juries unable to remain fair and impartial, which can delay the 
administration of justice indefinitely.91 Another trial for these defendants is 
fundamentally unfair, as this indefinite delay places defendants in a position where 
they struggle to defend their liberty, especially if they remain incarcerated.92
Ohio should follow Ingram and dismiss cases when appropriate after multiple 
mistrials to avoid this fundamental unfairness.93 In Ingram, police arrested defendant 
Edward Ingram for bank robbery.94 After two mistrials, the government had no new 
evidence, but simply wished to keep pressing forward in the hopes that continuing 
would result in a conviction.95 For defendants, like Anderson and Ingram, stuck in 
“legal limbo,” the issue is adversarial fairness, which strikes at the heart of the Due 
Course of Law Clause.96 Courts fail to recognize that in these cases, the State has had 
its fair share of chances to convict.97 Fair play now dictates dismissal.98 Moreover, the 
State can only take away a defendant’s liberty upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.99
Multiple mistrials increases the likelihood that the State cannot meet this burden; yet, 
the Ohio Due Course of Law Clause continues to offer defendants little protection 
against abuse as the Clause becomes “shattered on the rocks of government power.”100
                                                          
90 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *14–15.
91 Id.
92 Anderson, 68 N.E.3d at 793.
93 United States v. Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384 (1976).
94 Id. at 385.
95 Id.; but see Aguilera v. Walsh, No. 01CIV. 2151(RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16711, 
2001 WL 1231524 at n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2001) (distinguishing Ingram after the defendant 
Aguilera claimed that retrials violated his due process rights).
96 Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 385.
97 Id.; see Merit Br., supra note 22, at *15–16 (“[T]he court dismissed the prosecution as a 
matter of ‘fair play.’ Ingram involved dismissal of an indictment following two hung jury 
mistrials where no new evidence was anticipated. Like Ingram, this case is one where the 
government has no new proof; it simply wants another chance.”); see also Ex parte Anderson, 
457 So.2d 446, 451–52 (Ala. 1984) (explaining that hung juries resulted when a defendant was 
tried three times for capital murder of a police officer). Dissenting opinions have also pointed 
out the need to recognize fairness:
The test is one of essential, basic fairness. How many times must a defendant in a 
criminal case be put to trial, with each one ending in a hung jury, before the ‘unfairness’ 
flag is raised? If three times is not enough, would three more times likewise not be 
enough?
Id. at 452 (Jones, J., dissenting).
98 Ingram, 412 F. Supp. at 384–85.
99 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *26 (discussing the Winship standard of “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt”).
100 Id. at *17–18 (“To allow this prosecution to go any further violates the fair play that the 
Constitution says must obtain.”).
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Ohio must breathe new life into this Clause, utilizing cases like Ingram to give greater 
protections to citizens facing multiple mistrials. Despite the State’s valid efforts and 
the seriousness of the charges, notions of adversarial fairness are still in play, cutting 
against the State’s sore attempt to wear down defendants with more retrials when no 
new evidence of guilt exists, and chances for a hung jury increase.101
2. A Trial Judge’s Refusal to Dismiss After Multiple Mistrials Can Lead to Claims 
Alleging Judicial Misconduct
When the State does not act, the Ohio Due Course of Law Clause demands 
measures by the judiciary to correct an unfairness that cannot be overlooked.102 For 
example, Witt permits judges to examine two factors to ensure fairness to defendants:
[T]rial judges have the inherent authority to terminate a prosecution in the 
exercise of a sound judicial discretion, where . . . repeated trials, free of 
prejudicial error, have resulted in genuinely deadlocked juries and where it 
appears that at future trials substantially the same evidence will be 
presented and that the probability of continued hung juries is great.103
This authority must be used with the greatest caution.104 Witt’s two factor analysis 
demonstrates judges’ prudent mindsets aimed at protecting the rights of the 
defendants, their victims, and their families when exercising this inherent authority.105
However, if a judge refuses to act when the time comes, claims alleging judicial 
misconduct could surface.106 Therefore, utilizing a full set of factors above and beyond 
the two factor test in Witt could help judges evade any of these allegations in Ohio.
“[T]o prevail on a claim of judicial misconduct, [a] petitioner must show that the 
state trial judge’s conduct was so fundamentally unfair as to deprive him of his 
                                                          
101 Id. at *13–14. Utilizing factors will also help Ohio avoid these constitutional violations.
102 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923) (noting that defendants were deprived 
due process of law). Because defendants subjected to multiple mistrials have been denied their 
constitutional protections etched into Ohio’s Due Course of Law Clause, the judiciary must step 
in and right this wrong. Merit Br., supra note 22, at *5–6. If this clause gives greater protections 
to Ohio’s citizens than the Federal Constitution’s due process clause, the courts have another 
reason to step in to enforce these protections.
103 State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (1978) (noting the importance of a trial judge’s 
inherent authority to dismiss); see State v. Kyles, 706 So.2d 611, 614 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(noting that “a decision [to dismiss] is a matter of sound judicial discretion by the trial court 
who heard the evidence, polled the juries, and is in the best position to know at what point 
‘enough is enough’”). In Kyles, the State tried defendant Realtor four times after indicting him 
for first degree murder. Kyles, 706 So.2d at 614.
104 Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 917 (nothing that the trial judge can invoke the court’s “discretionary 
right . . . in the interest of justice” as a basis for dismissing the indictments following mistrials 
due to jury deadlock. In Witt, defendants were indicted for first degree murder).
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Brown v. McKinney, 358 F. Supp. 2d 161, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that 
state trial judge questioning defendant during trial does not rise to the level of judicial 
misconduct).
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constitutional right to due process.”107 These claims could arise if prosecutors use their 
resources to repeatedly try to convince a jury to convict while a defendant remains in 
a frozen state of fear and exhaustion.108 A time will come where a judge must step in, 
order the action that halts this unfairness, and declare that the State’s attempts at 
conviction have run dry.109 Refusing to recognize that enough is enough is 
fundamentally unfair, and, as stated above, violates a defendant’s due process rights.110
Though judges possess the inherent power to end a prosecution after multiple 
mistrials, deciding whether or not dismissal is appropriate is more complicated. To 
avoid allegations of judicial misconduct when a trial judge allows the State to 
endlessly seek a conviction, Ohio’s trial judges need factors to help them properly 
exercise their “implicit powers” to terminate a prosecution, especially after hung 
juries.111 A list of factors beyond the two discussed in Witt will guide a judge in Ohio 
to better know whether the time has come to make this crucial decision.
B. Keeping a Defendant in Limbo During Mistrials Causes Lasting Psychological 
Harm and Augments the Possibility of Conviction
Besides quieting claims of judicial misconduct, Ohio’s new factors will decrease 
the likelihood that an incarcerated defendant will suffer psychological harm as he sits 
in jail through multiple mistrials. Defendants need protection “against the trauma and 
expense of multiple trials.”112 As two scholars note, “[t]he consequences of pre-trial 
incarceration can be devastating for people already struggling to make ends meet, 
resulting in lost jobs, homelessness, disrupted mental health, substance abuse and 
medical treatment . . . .”113 These conditions could only become much worse while 
                                                          
107 Id. at 172–73; see Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Robinson 
v. Ricks, No. 00 CV 4526 JG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14023, 2004 WL 1638171 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 22, 2004).
108 State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 519 (N.J. 1985).
109 See, e.g., id. at 520–21.
110 Id. at 519. (“The anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, and expense to the defendant of 
continual reprosecution where no new evidence exists is a proper subject for the application of 
traditional notions of fundamental fairness and substantial justice.”).
111 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982); see State v. Whiteside, No. 08AP-
602, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1652, 2009 WL 1099435, at ¶ 20 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009) 
(stating that on appeal, appellant argues to this court that he was held in jail for over two years 
enduring the “stress and strain of multiple trials and long periods of uncertainty”). Having a test 
will also avoid judicial misconduct claims from parties accusing a judge of prematurely 
discharging the jury. See Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(providing an example of judicial misconduct claim). The opposing side may argue that hung 
juries are rare. However, for example, “[s]tate court hung jury rates in 30 large, urban 
jurisdictions averaged 6.2 percent.” PAUL L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 83 (2002). This type of hung jury rate should be a cause 
for concern.
112 Estes, supra note 85, at 199.
113 Lisa Schreibersdorf & Andrea Nieves, Pre-Trial Detention and Bail, in THE STATE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2016, 97 (Mark E. Wojcik ed., 2016) I believe post-trial incarceration 
augments these problems as well, especially because defendants can experience trouble coping 
with a longer incarceration period despite no conviction at trial.
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defendants wait for a new trial to start after a mistrial. For example, years of isolated 
incarceration while in “legal limbo” damages a prisoner’s mental stability because 
“[i]mprisonment can create or exacerbate mental health conditions.”114 These mental 
health conditions could push a detainee to attempt suicide or resort to more violence 
while behind bars.115 When no resolution is announced after trial, defendants return to 
jail, piling more of this strain on themselves, their families, and the criminal justice 
system during post-trial incarceration. With no money for release and no judgment 
entered, defendants stay behind bars while the State endlessly retries their cases.
Incarceration also augments the possibility of conviction.116 Incarcerated 
defendants are much more likely to plead guilty and serve prison time than those 
released pretrial.117 In New York City, ninety percent of people detained on bail plead 
guilty as compared to forty percent of people who are not detained.118 Multiple retrials 
after mistrials drain defendants both emotionally and mentally; thus, they could plead 
guilty simply to end this “Wheel of Misfortune.”119 Anderson told the trial judge that 
“[h]e is worn down. His family is worn down. His lawyer is worn down.”120 Burdens 
such as limited access to proper representation push defendants like Anderson to 
accept these plea bargains.121 Likewise, after the State fails and prepares to try again, 
the defendant’s return to jail can be devastating.122 If Ohio adopts factors to consider, 
                                                          
114 Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 56 (2014) 
(distinguishing defendants who are incarcerated from those who are not).
115 Id.; see, e.g., Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 10; see also Wiseman, supra note 70. 
116 Klein, supra note 74, at 294 (“[T]he tendency of pretrial detainees ultimately to be found 
guilty may reflect juror bias. Jurors may reason that if the defendant was incarcerated, then he 
must be guilty of the charged offense because the government would not have jailed the 
defendant in the first place.”).
117 Appleman, supra note 70, at 1320 (“The mere possibility of pretrial imprisonment often 
compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their right to trial.”); see, e.g., Shima Baradaran 
& Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 499–556 (2012) (ultimately 
suggesting to readers that judges could release 25% more defendants); see also SCHÖNTEICH,
supra note 4, at 1 (“Given that the presumption of innocence is universal, detaining arrestees 
pending trial should be rare.”). This idea can be distinguished from those who are released 
before trial.
118 Schreibersdorf & Nieves, supra note 113, at 97.
119 This can be distinguishable from only pre-trial detention before one trial. See, e.g., Eric 
M. Johnson, Washington Teacher Told Not to Use Disciplinary “Wheel of Misfortune,”
REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-washington-misfortune-
idUSKCN0I62GL20141017. Anderson has been stuck spinning in this wheel for over fourteen 
years.
120 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *9. A 2012 report by the New York City Criminal Justice 
Agency determined that “detention itself creates enough pressure to increase guilty pleas.” 
Schreibersdorf & Nieves, supra note 113, at 98.
121 F. Andrew Hessick III, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the 
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 207 (2002).
122 See Karl Etters, Judge Declares Mistrial in Henry Segura Murder Trial, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2017/08/16/jury-finds-
segura-quadruple-murder-charges/571846001/.
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courts will be able to determine when to release these detained defendants and avoid 
further harm from post-trial incarceration.123
Many detainees plead guilty because “in some cases, the periods that defendants 
spend in jail awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential 
sentences.”124 Anderson’s case can be distinguished from others not confronting
multiple mistrials. In 2017, Anderson will spend his fifteenth year in jail awaiting 
conviction and already would have been eligible for parole if a jury had convicted him 
after his first trial.125 Not all defendants can steadfastly assert their innocence as long 
as Anderson, especially when juries cannot render an effective decision to acquit or 
convict. Weighing factors will allow Ohio courts to avoid this fundamentally unfair 
and lengthy post-trial incarceration, essentially serving a “sentence” without a
conviction.
C. Does the Presumption of Innocence Become the Presumption of Guilt?
Allowing prosecutors relentlessly to try to get a conviction from the jury muddles 
the fundamental right provided to all defendants facing criminal charges: the 
presumption of innocence. The prosecution’s diligent efforts to convict and a trial 
court’s refusal to dismiss an indictment following multiple mistrials, especially despite 
repeated hung juries, demonstrate that these trial court actors may be presuming that 
a defendant like Anderson did commit the crime.126 Justice Black describes this danger 
of searching for guilt where it does not exist in Green v. United States:
                                                          
123 Although the State and its supporters may counter this argument by asserting that post-
trial incarceration is necessary to avoid flight and ensure the community’s safety, this argument 
fails and can be distinguished from this situation “because it seems to punish accused offenders 
before conviction by members of the community, violating the very spirit of our criminal justice 
system.” See Appleman, supra note 70, at 1321.
124 See Wiseman, supra note 70.
Detention also puts the detainee in a disadvantageous position during the plea 
bargaining process; entails a danger of extracting an unreliable confession from a 
detainee who is ready to pay a grave price in return for immediate freedom or ending 
the uncertainty; and many studies indicate a subconscious bias and prejudice against 
defendants that are held in custody that is reflected in both the verdict and sentence. 
This result may stem from a variety of circumstances including the damage caused to 
the defense by the detention. 
Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 286 (2002).
125 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 800 (Ohio 2016) (Lanzinger, J., concurring). Though 
not explored in this Note, this excessive “post-trial incarceration” could be considered cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
especially because these detainees are arguably being punished with no conviction. However, 
courts have not yet been willing to take such an approach. E.g., Harris v. State, 539 A.2d 637, 
644 (Md. 1988) (holding that another capital punishment sentencing hearing would not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment despite “unnerving strain” induced by the numerous 
death penalty hearings).
126 See Merit Br., supra note 22, at *5–6.
The Constitution presumes that Chris Anderson did not commit this crime. The State is 
entitled to rebut that presumption with evidence at a trial. It has been unable to do so, 
despite ample opportunity. So far, those in power have presumed Chris Anderson did 
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[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby 
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing 
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.127
Regardless of the presumption of innocence, Justice Black suggests that a court or a 
jury may find guilt where none exists if the prosecution can infer guilt prematurely 
while a criminal defendant is forced to endlessly endure multiple mistrials.128 This 
premature assumption of guilt essentially erases the presumption of innocence. 
However, as the trial judge boldly proclaimed in State v. Abbati:
The entire question [of when to dismiss an indictment with prejudice 
following multiple mistrials] must be viewed, considered, analyzed and 
decided in the shadow of, and against a backdrop of the fundamental and 
omnipresent proposition that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty 
and it is the State’s burden to prove that guilt. Should the State, having 
failed to prove guilt, be permitted to indefinitely try the defendant until 
barred only by a unanimous pronouncement by 12 jurors that it has failed? 
Given the disabilities, stigma, financial hardship, uncertainty and 
restrictions that are visited upon a criminal defendant pending trial, it would 
seem to fly in the face of the national philosophy implicit in these 
constitutional safeguards to answer that question any way other than, no.129
Therefore, Ohio should adopt the trial judge’s views in Abbati. Ohio trial courts need 
to view the multiple mistrials question by first considering the presumption of 
innocence to prevent its disappearance. Perhaps judges could instruct the jury to 
remember this presumption, or the defense could remind the jury and the judge of its 
importance before deliberations. These courts should conduct further analysis with 
this presumption at the forefront.
1. Impact on the Victim and Her Family
While prosecutors and other critics supporting the interests of the State argue that 
justice for victims and Ohio’s citizens must be attained through a conviction, in this 
instance, that argument is weak and distinguishable.130 When a defendant faces 
multiple mistrials, “a serious crime is [likely] involved.”131 These serious crimes, such 
                                                          
commit the crime. It is through those glasses that they have viewed the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.
Id. Tension now exists between a defendant’s right to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty 
by a unanimous jury during his trial and the prosecution’s right to a conviction.
127 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957).
128 Id.
129 State v. Abbati, 478 A.2d 1212, 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); see State v. 
Gonzales, 49 P.3d 681, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (adopting Abbati’s factors “to be weighed by 
the trial court in deciding a motion to dismiss after successive trials result in deadlocked juries.” 
Here, father and son were indicted for first–degree murder and two trials resulted in hung juries).
130 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *25.
131 State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1169 (Vt. 1995).
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as robbery, rape, kidnapping, murder, and aggravated murder, are crimes where 
victims and their families must suffer through these endless trials and must relive their 
experiences.132 In Anderson, though Amber Zurcher was tragically murdered, her 
family and friends continue to wait for almost fifteen years for some sense of closure 
that they rightfully deserve.133 Furthermore, crime victims have little or no say about 
how law enforcement conducts investigations, what charges the prosecutor chooses to 
bring, or whether the prosecutor will offer the defendant a plea bargain.134 For many 
of these reasons, victims and their families, like Amber Zurcher’s family, are put “in 
an extraordinary position of dependence and trust.”135 Therefore, critics of dismissal 
see the trial court’s job as one in which it needs to respond to the victim’s interests.136
Such victims clearly want to see the offenders punished. However, incarcerated 
defendants who sit in limbo during multiple mistrials experience a significant loss of 
personal freedom while they wait endlessly for a verdict.137 If a jury cannot render one, 
victims should rethink what they consider punishment and be open to the idea that 
while a dismissal may not provide closure, law enforcement can try to gather other 
suspects for the crime. Additionally, though admittedly quite hard to pursue, perhaps 
victims should acknowledge the defendant’s loss of freedom as punishment enough, 
consider that the presumption of innocence should prevail, and understand that a 
dismissal might be warranted.
2. The Interests of the Prosecutor and the Community at Large 
Critics of dismissal argue the prosecution’s valid efforts and the State’s strong 
interest in the public safety compete with the presumption of innocence. Prosecutors 
see victims suffering from tragedy, commit to getting a conviction, and present all 
evidence they receive.138 If prosecutors take valid steps to obtain a conviction and 
engage in no misconduct, many of them believe that they deserve to seek another trial 
after a mistrial regardless of hung juries.139 Moreover, prosecutors are supposed to 
                                                          
132 Id.
133 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790 (Ohio 2016).
134 See Jeanne Bishop & Mark Osler, Prosecutors and Victims: Why Wrongful Convictions 
Matter, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1031, 1040 (2015) (discussing crime victim and 
prosecutors’ roles in a criminal prosecution).
135 Id.
136 Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782, 786 (W. Va. 1984).
137 See Marianna Bettman, How Many Times Can a Criminal Defendant Be Re-Tried?, AM.
ISRAELITE (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.americanisraelite.com/legally_speaking/article_d79673d4-b65f-11e6-9a55-
b74b35587492.htm.
138 Bishop & Osler, supra note 134, at 1035–36 (noting that the prosecutor’s ego is 
something not to be overlooked).
139 See State v. Abbati, 478 A.2d 1212, 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that 
although prosecutor’s discretion to reprosecute defendant is subject to power of court, trial court 
must defer to prosecutor’s decision when fundamental fairness does not compel dismissal); see 
also State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1169, 1172 (Vt. 1995) (“[T]he trial court’s discretion [to 
dismiss] is itself limited by the deference it must normally give to the prosecutor’s decision to 
retry a case.”).
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seek justice.140 If courts release defendants who face serious charges back into the 
community before a jury convicts them, such a premature release could jeopardize the 
community’s safety.141 The 1984 Bail Reform Act, a federal statute that states 
including Ohio have studied for use in its own laws, was predicated on the protection 
of the community.142 If an indicted defendant like Anderson did indeed commit the 
crime, allowing him to return to the community and potentially commit more crimes 
could put another innocent victim in harm’s way.143 For these reasons, “[t]he State, the 
victim, and the public at large all have an interest in obtaining a conclusive outcome 
in a criminal prosecution”; crime victims and the community should feel safe 
regardless of numerous mistrials resulting in the defendant’s loss of freedom.144
3. The Prompt Administration of Justice and Reviving the Presumption of Innocence
Despite the interests the victim, the prosecutor, and the community have in a 
conviction, society has a strong interest in the prompt administration of justice.145 Yet, 
this prompt administration of justice could very well be a dismissal with prejudice by 
the trial judge. Looking to Anderson, the Court “ignores that the ‘ends of justice’ [that 
must be met through a conviction] does not mean repeated attempts to convict a 
defendant who someone in authority thinks is guilty.”146 A trial court actor, whether 
the judge or prosecutor, does not have the right to find guilt prematurely just to award 
the victims justice at the defendant’s expense.147 More mistrials only means “a victim 
                                                          
140 See People v. Boyer, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936, 946 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980) (“The decision to 
dismiss an information in furtherance of justice should be utilized ‘as sparingly as garlic.’”); 
Appleman, supra note 70.
141 Sauve, 666 A.2d at 1168 (noting that the court needs to weigh the interest of the 
community at large); but see Kitai, supra note 124, at 282 (“Preserving the presumption of 
innocence until the end of the criminal proceedings, despite incriminating evidence, 
demonstrates that the accused person’s status is equal to that of other members of the 
community; she is entitled to the same spectrum of rights and obligations.”).
142 Appleman, supra note 70, at 1330.
143 See Bishop & Osler, supra note 134.
144 Sauve, 666 A.2d at 1169.
145 Id. (“Repeated trials involving the same offense can frustrate the search for truth and the 
effective administration of justice by depleting the resources of the parties, by imposing 
hardships on witnesses, and by fostering the perfunctory presentation of stale testimony, the 
exaggeration of subtle differences in witnesses’ recollections to challenge their credibility, and 
the tailoring of testimony based on the jury’s perceived reaction in prior trials.”).
146 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *25.
147 It is also important to note that a prosecutor could be wrong, and wrongful conviction is 
important to avoid at all costs. See Bishop & Osler, supra note 134, at 1035–36:
Piled on top of the heavy weight of tragedy and judgment for a conscientious prosecutor 
is the repulsive cost of being wrong. Being a prosecutor is comparable to being a 
surgeon, whose smallest slip-up can lead to death. For prosecutors, a mistake can lead 
to that same result (in death penalty states), or to a lesser but still terrible wrong: the 
lengthy incarceration of an innocent person.
Id. at 1034–35. Scholars also argue that pretrial detainment is an example of finding guilt 
prematurely. See Appleman, supra note 70, at 1321–22 (“These offenders are considered 
innocent at this phase of the criminal process . . . . Punishment, in other words, is being imposed 
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will incur [trauma] by reliving his experience” at more trials with no resolution in 
sight.148 Scholars note that the presumption of innocence is a “cloak” that should never 
come off unless the prosecution proves the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.149 Removing this “cloak” too early has created a new tension between the 
presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s right to pursue a conviction. But for
Anderson, another trial only means more unnecessary reminders of Amber’s tragic 
death for her family and friends as the prosecution tries to convict Anderson yet again. 
While the judge should take the interests of prosecutors, crime victims, and the 
community into consideration before agreeing to dismiss an indictment with prejudice, 
if the prosecution cannot convince a jury of the defendant’s guilt, then the judge must 
release the defendant to avoid a greater loss of freedom. A defendant’s release when 
the appropriate time has come will likely help preserve the presumption of innocence 
and return this concept to its historical roots.150
IV. A SOLUTION TO OHIO’S PROBLEM: PROPOSED FACTORS TO TACKLE THIS ISSUE
Although many other states have adopted factors for trial courts to consider when 
confronted with the issue of multiple mistrials,151 the Ohio Supreme Court has not yet 
followed suit in recognizing any factors of its own. Consequently, the court leaves 
defendants in Ohio without answers even though valid solutions exist. If trial judges 
can determine whether the situation warrants dismissal by weighing factors, their 
discretion will be more likely to survive harsh criticism by dissatisfied parties. 
Recently, when Ohio’s Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals confronted Anderson’s 
motion to dismiss, the judges examined Hawaii’s and Iowa’s factors because courts 
                                                          
on those not yet convicted, without the imprimatur of the jury.”). I expand on this notion by 
arguing that post-trial incarceration without a conviction is another example of finding guilt 
prematurely. See discussion infra Section III.B. Employing factors will help return to the 
presumption of innocence’s roots, where the presumption disappeared only if guilt was 
established at trial by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 
461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983); Lisa H. Wallach, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: 
Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 130, 
145 (1987).
149 See Pagano v. Allard, 218 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[W]hen the prosecutor 
described the presumption as a ‘cloak’ that ‘comes off’ at the ‘end of the trial,’ he diluted the 
petitioner’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
150 See, e.g., Kitai, supra note 124, at 282. (“The presumption of innocence bears a 
declarative and educational message that as long as a court has not determined the accused’s 
guilt, she is entitled to a presumption of innocence to the same degree as the policeman that is 
investigating her, the prosecutor that is putting her on trial, and the judge that is delivering the 
judgment in her case.”).
151 Another example not discussed previously is People v. Kirby, 460 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (choosing to reinstate a murder charge when it was first dismissed by a 
trial court following three hung juries after the court weighed various factors); see Sullivan v. 
State, 874 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that a judge has the discretion to consider 
factors in deciding whether to dismiss an indictment for defendant Sullivan accused of murder 
after three attempts at conviction ended in mistrials).
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like the Ninth District in Roper152 had previously taken the initiative to examine other 
states’ factors.153 Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court refuses to recognize these factors, 
leaving Ohio courts without adequate guidance for this exceptionally difficult exercise 
of discretion.
A. The Proposed Factors
Because Ohio’s lower courts—like the Roper court, which utilized a two-factor 
test—are willing to examine factors when deciding whether to dismiss, the Ohio 
Supreme Court should follow suit. Ohio should follow precedent from other states to 
ensure that judges do not overlook defendants’ constitutional rights, rights to a 
presumption of innocence, and rights to a release from jail after multiple mistrials. 
Judges should weigh these factors after considering the presumption of innocence, and 
the judges should not dismiss the interests of the victim and the community at large 
when weighing the factors.154 With these rights in mind, Ohio should adopt the 
Moriwake factors with the addition of one Lundeen factor.155 Ohio courts should utilize 
the following seven factors in this order:
1) the number of prior mistrials and the circumstances of the jury 
deliberation therein, so far as is known; 
2) the character of prior trials in terms of length, complexity, and similarity
of evidence presented; 
3) the likelihood of any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if
allowed; 
4) whether the defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial, and the
length of such incarceration;
5) the severity of the offense charged; 
6) the professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel, 
particularly that of the prosecuting attorney; and
                                                          
152 State v. Roper, No. 20836, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7191, 2002 WL 31890116, at ¶ 87 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002).
153 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 711–12 (Haw. 1982) (holding that the trial court 
properly dismissed an indictment with prejudice accusing defendant Gilbert Masaru Moriwake 
of manslaughter after two hung juries resulted in mistrials); State v. Anderson, No. 11 MA 43, 
2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 1956, 2015 WL 3409047, at ¶¶ 13–16 (Ohio Ct. App. May 20, 2015); 
Roper, No. 20836, at ¶ 87; State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding that a remand to the trial court was necessary to weigh factors and decide if charges 
accusing defendant, Tina Patrice Lundeen, of selling alcoholic beverages to a minor should be 
dismissed).
154 See, e.g., State v. Knapstad, 706 P.2d 238, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (“The decision 
necessarily involves weighing justice to society and fairness to the defendant and involves 
consideration of such factors as the availability of evidence of guilt.”).
155 See Annotation, Propriety of Court’s Dismissing Indictment or Prosecution Because of 
Failure of Jury to Agree After Successive Trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274 (1981) (discussing the 
outcome in State v. Moriwake) (“[T]here was no indication that third trial would proceed any 
differently than previous two nearly identical trials in which two separate juries were unable to 
reach verdict despite sound judicial efforts to encourage ‘considered judgment.’”).
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7) the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative case strength.156
The factors applying to a specific defendant’s mistrials will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of the individual case. These proposed factors are more detailed than 
the two-factor analysis example in Witt, but limited enough at seven factors that an 
Ohio trial court could avoid confusion or an overwhelming decision-making 
process.157
B. Applying the Factors 
A defendant’s constitutional right to due process and his right to a presumption of 
innocence must be protected. Ohio’s first three new factors will push the trial judge to 
seriously look at the trial (or trials) already completed and to consider what a possible 
new trial would entail. Because some judges will face a decision to dismiss after only 
one mistrial, and some judges will face this decision after multiple mistrials like in
Anderson, trial judges need to first look backwards and seriously consider whether the 
number of mistrials have substantially impacted the defendant’s right to due 
process.158
Furthermore, judges can declare mistrials for a variety of reasons.159 Some 
mistrials are the result of deadlocked juries while others stem from erroneous 
evidentiary rulings or misconduct by the jurors, prosecutor, or defense.160 Though the 
types of mistrials vary, if the judge examines the reasons each mistrial, she can better 
understand whether or not a retrial will unfairly prejudice the defendant or unfairly 
end the prosecution’s efforts.161 Finally, the judge needs to examine the characteristics 
of the prior trial (or trials). The judge must look at the evidence presented, how long 
the trials lasted, and how complex the facts, witnesses, and exhibits surrounding the 
case are to better understand why the trials did not end with a jury verdict. Therefore, 
the first two factors will ensure that a judge looks backward, closely examines the 
previous trials, and accounts for the circumstances surrounding the decisions to 
declare mistrials.
                                                          
156 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 711–12; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236 (hereinafter each 
individually referred to in successive order as “factor one, factor two, factor three, factor four, 
factor five, factor six, and factor seven”). All of the factors are derived from Moriwake except 
for factor four, the defendant’s incarceration factor, which comes from Lundeen. Most cases 
cited to in this Note reference both Moriwake and Lundeen.
157 See, e.g., Joel M. Schumm, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 35 IND. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (2002) (“[T]he test adopted . . . in Sivels will likely be 
easily applied in future cases because, although it includes all the relevant considerations, 
generally only few will apply in a given case.”).
158 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *19–20.
159 DANIEL E. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 292 (7th ed. 2014).
160 Id. In this Note, I have focused on deadlocked juries as a strong reason for dismissal. 
161 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 711–12 (examining in detail two previous mistrials with no new 
expectations for a third trial); see generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes 
II: A Proposal for a More Serious Look at “The Weight of the Evidence,” 7 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 84, 85, 88 (2013) (exploring situations where “the prosecution charges an offense that 
it has no chance of proving”). If the prosecution intends to introduce no new evidence at a 
subsequent trial, Leonetti suggests that the case be considered a “weak” one. Id. at 88.
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After the trial judge examines the prior mistrials, she can look ahead to the impact 
of future trials using factor three. Many of these new trials—following validly 
declared mistrials—are identical to the previous trials, with the same evidence and 
arguments from both sides.162 For example, in future trials for Anderson, the 
prosecutor plans to present his case with the same evidence as used in the previous 
trials.163 Trial judges in Ohio need to look forward and attempt to realistically predict 
if another trial will be any different to ensure that prosecutors are not given endless 
chances to convict. If the prosecution does not plan to present new evidence at trial
and more than just one trial has ended in mistrial, the trial judge may come to the 
“breaking point” where enough is enough; the judge can use these first three factors 
to back up her decision to dismiss the indictment.164
The fourth factor from Lundeen examines the defendant’s incarceration; a judge 
can use this factor to seriously consider the dangers of continued post-trial 
incarceration after mistrials.165 When a trial judge examines the defendant’s 
incarceration, using Anderson’s unbelievably long incarceration as a prime example, 
he should examine how long the defendant is locked up awaiting another trial. If the 
defendant has served as much time in jail as the time he would have received in a 
sentence following an actual conviction, this factor alone could be enough for a trial 
judge to dismiss the case.166 Though Anderson’s time in jail awaiting conviction 
appears unique, this case is not an outlier.167 The requirement of unanimous jury 
convictions and the mounds of evidence that come with cases carrying high charges 
mean defendants’ time in jail could equal or surpass the time they would have gotten 
had they been convicted of the crime at the conclusion of the first trial.168 No error on 
the prosecution’s part and no double jeopardy problems exist in cases like those 
discussed in this Note, so courts often overlook such a fact.169 However, forgetting 
about such a harsh reality is a miscarriage of justice. If a trial judge uses the 
defendant’s incarceration as a factor when deciding whether to try a case again, justice 
would be better served.
Further, if Ohio courts seriously considered the incarceration factor, defendants 
may no longer feel so desperate to escape jail that they consider a plea agreement their 
only way out. If an Ohio court kept track of a defendant’s time in jail throughout these 
mistrials, the court could avoid putting a defendant in an unfair position, feeling he 
has no choice but to accept the plea. Therefore, especially in a case like Anderson’s, 
                                                          
162 See, e.g., State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tenn. 1978).
163 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790, 792–93 (Ohio 2016).
164 U.S. v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 1976).
165 State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980) (telling the trial court to 
look closely at Lundeen’s incarceration).
166 If a defendant like Anderson was forced to endure another trial, if a jury did finally render 
a conviction, the judge could sentence the defendant to time served, and the defendant would 
be immediately released because he had sat in jail for so long already, but with a conviction 
permanently attached to his record. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
167 See, e.g., Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 10.
168 See, e.g., Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790.
169 See, e.g., id.
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Ohio’s new fourth factor examining a defendant’s incarceration could justifiably 
outweigh the other factors.
Additionally, the State’s knowledge that the judge may give deference to the 
defense after weighing factors one through four can help push the State to spend 
considerable time gathering and preparing additional evidence if they intend to retry 
a defendant. This knowledge also may motivate the State to offer a better plea 
agreement to the defendant. The State, and even the defense, should take time to 
understand the reasoning behind juries’ decisions and should explore what they could 
change if the trial judge permits another trial. This preparation could help tip the scale 
in the State’s direction and avoid the likelihood of another mistrial.170 Alternatively, 
this additional work could help the State prevent a dismissal with prejudice.171
After the Ohio trial judge examines the prior trials and the implications of another 
trial while the defendant remains in jail, the judge should utilize factors five and six 
to protect the State’s rights to obtain a conclusive outcome in a criminal prosecution. 
The judge’s consideration of the severity of the charges against a defendant is 
important because, as discussed above, cases where the jury has trouble rendering an 
appropriate verdict are often those that involve very serious crimes.172 The trial judge 
should examine the conduct of counsel as well, especially the prosecuting attorney’s 
conduct who works diligently to seek a conviction based on these severe charges.173
The trial judge should be able to reward the State’s hard work and professional 
conduct. Frequently, the prosecutor engaged in no improper conduct throughout these 
many trials, but both sides simply cannot sway the jury one way or another in these 
complex cases. Consequently, these two factors will allow judges to give deference to 
the prosecution’s efforts if the situation permits.174
Finally, Ohio’s new factors would also account for a trial judge’s own discretion.175
Rather than forcing the trial judge to consider these factors solely on the objective 
facts and history of the case, the seventh factor would allow judges in Ohio to properly 
evaluate the strength of a case using their knowledge, expertise, and inherent authority 
                                                          
170 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712–13 (Haw. 1982); Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236.
171 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 711–12; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236; see Estes, supra note 85, 
at 199 n.4 (“[P]rosecutors often refuse to reprosecute in multiple deadlock jury cases because 
of the likelihood of further hung juries and the concomitant waste of judicial resources.”); see 
also State v. Wong, 40 P.3d 914, 929 (Haw. 2002) (providing an example of prosecutorial 
misconduct, violating factor six) (“We are cognizant of the State’s strong interest in prosecuting 
crime, but we are equally cognizant that the State’s duty is to pursue justice, not convictions, 
and the prosecutor has a duty to act as a minister of justice to pursue prosecutions by fair 
means.”).
172 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 712–13. Multiple juries may have trouble staying fair and 
impartial if these serious cases are highly publicized, making it even more difficult for them to 
render an appropriate verdict.
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 708 (holding that factor one worked in favor of the defendant because his state of 
mind was muddled by extreme intoxication); see Berch & Berch, supra note 25, at 559 
(discussing the need for a rule for the legislative branch to impose) (“[T]he vast majority of the 
cases that have examined whether to bar retrial have involved capital crimes or other serious 
felonies.”).
175 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 712; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236.
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to dismiss.176 This factor permits judges to interject their own thoughts of the case into 
their decision.177 Trial judges “have the right to order the discharge; and the security 
which the public have for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this 
discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under 
their oaths of office.”178 Adopting this “judicial judgment” factor allows Ohio trial 
judges to properly execute this trusted discretion by interposing their valued 
thoughts.179
After weighing the factors that apply in a given case, if the prosecution and defense 
exercise every opportunity to obtain a proper verdict from the jury and cannot succeed, 
dismissal with prejudice likely would be in the court’s discretion. If the trial judge 
believes another trial is fair, then dismissal with prejudice will not be warranted.
“[S]ociety . . . has an interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process,”180 and 
with these factors, the decision to dismiss with prejudice is subject to the power and 
the responsibility of the court.181 Ultimately, these factors account for all case parties’ 
interests and can help guide a trial judge’s important decision.
C. Advantages of Adopting These Factors 
If Ohio were to adopt these factors, one advantage of doing so stems from the 
format of these new guidelines—as factors, not elements. Judges could utilize these 
factors under a balancing test where not all seven pieces must be met and not all must 
fit neatly together. Allowing a trial judge to consider factors in a manner that would 
tip the scale either in favor of or in opposition to a dismissal with prejudice would 
bring more legitimacy to a trial judge’s decision.182 Like the Rules of Evidence, these 
factors would allow prosecutors and defense counsel to better plan their cases and 
increase consistency across them. Using these factors could point a judge to ordering 
another trial rather than dismissing the indictment.183 Many courts that have adopted 
factors of their own have ultimately decided to try the case again.184 Yet, weighing 
factors would help judges survive scrutiny from the prosecution and the defense if the 
outcome is not what either side expected. These factors could make decisions more 
predictable, increase uniformity across judges, and allow defendants to intelligently 
decide whether to take a plea deal if another trial is ordered.
Furthermore, balancing these factors would allow an appellate court to decide 
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. If the prosecution or defense were 
                                                          
176 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 712; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236.
177 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 712; Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d at 236.
178 Moriwake, 647 P.2d at 709 n.5. (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)). 
179 Id. at 712 (holding that the interests of society and of criminal defendants “requires that 
we more fully delineate the parameters within which this discretion [to dismiss] is properly 
exercised”).
180 Id. (quoting State v. Braunsdorf, 297 N.W.2d 808, 817 (Wis. 1980) (Day, J., dissenting)).
181 Id.
182 Id. (noting the idea of a balancing test).
183 See, e.g., U.S. v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 1976) (“There indeed may be a 
breaking point, but we do not believe it was reached in the instant case.”).
184 See, e.g., id.
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to appeal the trial judge’s decision to either dismiss the case with prejudice or to allow 
the prosecution to again try to pull a conviction out of the jury, the appellate court 
could review the factors the judge relied on to understand the thought process behind 
the judge’s decision. Therefore, the appellate court’s task would be simpler if the trial 
judge provided reasons for each factor that supported dismissal or retrial.
While concretely outlining all of the circumstances where dismissal would be 
appropriate, pointing to a concrete number of mistrials that trigger dismissal or laying 
down a blanket rule that says a mistrial following a deadlocked jury ultimately 
warrants dismissal is not possible; these factors would bring stability to Ohio in the 
future. As courts continue to tackle this issue, they would know what action to take 
and where to look for guidance. Trial judges should build off the stability 
demonstrated in states like Hawaii and Iowa that recognize and have been applying 
factors to these situations successfully since the 1980s and should implement factors 
of their own.185
V. CONCLUSION: NEED FOR FACTORS TO PREVENT EXPLOITATION IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Christopher Anderson continues to sit in jail as the prosecution prepares to take its 
sixth bite at the apple, even after two of those bites led to deadlocked juries.186
Throughout all of these mistrials, Anderson remains in jail, having lost his personal
freedom.187 His defense attorney and the prosecutor now prepare to re-examine the 
evidence and take another stab at convincing a jury of their position, all while 
Anderson remains in “legal limbo.” Anderson is one of many defendants subject to 
                                                          
185 State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 713, n.16 (Haw. 1982) (quoting Salt Lake City v. 
Hanson, 425 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1967)) (“[T]here is a sound basis in public policy for requiring 
the judge who assumes the serious responsibility of dismissing a case to set forth his reasons 
for doing so in order that all may know what invokes the court’s discretion and whether its 
action is justified.”); see State v. Abbati, 478 A.2d 1212, 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1984) 
([T]he only question is how many times may the State have to prove its case. It should be 
immediately evident that ‘how many times’ will vary.”); see also State v. Huffman, 215 P.3d 
390, 396 (Ariz. 2009) (mentioning Abbati’s factors, for example); State v. Roper, No. 20836, 
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7191, 2002 WL 31890116, at ¶ 76 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) 
(noting that some cases have held that two or three mistrials is enough, while others have held 
that four mistrials “were not considered to be too many”); State v. Lundeen, 297 N.W.2d 232, 
236 (Iowa Ct. App. 1980).
186 State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978). The prosecution’s unwavering desire 
to force a conviction can be analogized as a modern-day Adam and Eve story. 3 Genesis 2:7:
The woman said to the serpent, “We may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, but God 
did say, You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you 
must not touch it, or you will die.” “You will not certainly die,” the serpent said to the 
woman . . . . When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and 
pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it. 
She also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate it. 
Early on, we are taught to avoid this trickery. See Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs Quotes,
IMBD, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0029583/quotes (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (“A poisoned 
apple! Sleeping death! Oh ho ho ho. One taste of the poisoned apple and the victim’s eyes will 
close forever . . . in the sleeping death!”). This apple in Anderson’s case certainly has become 
poisonous after five trials, two of which ended in deadlocked juries.
187 State v. Anderson, 68 N.E.3d 790 (Ohio 2016).
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enduring multiple mistrials because the jury simply cannot be convinced either way. 
This miscarriage of justice is summed up in Anderson’s Appellate Brief to the Ohio 
Supreme Court: 
How can we say a system is fair when a man who is presumed not to have 
committed this crime languishes in jail, doing life on the installment plan 
between trials? If we cannot hold up this case as a paragon of the idea of 
due process, if we cannot hold it up as a paragon of the right to defend 
liberty or have justice administered without denial or delay, then we have 
no choice but to order the action that says that enough is enough.188
While Ohio may never provide a concrete magic number of mistrials that will force 
a trial court to say enough is enough, courts need to know when to take the apple away 
from the prosecution so that defendants like Christopher Anderson do not remain 
incarcerated indefinitely awaiting conviction.189 Ohio courts need to apply the 
suggested factors to a situation where a defendant attempts to dismiss an indictment 
with prejudice after multiple mistrials, especially following repeated hung juries to 
rectify this miscarriage of justice.190 Adopting factors will help ease the tension 
between the rights of the accused and the public interest,191 allowing a trial judge to 
exercise his inherent authority to terminate a prosecution and permitting an appellate 
court to more clearly understand the trial court’s reasoning when deciding whether or 
not to uphold or reverse that decision.192 These factors would also increase consistency 
                                                          
188 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *19–20.
189 See Pelletier O’Sullivan, supra note 27 (noting that one possible alternative option that 
courts consider to avoid deadlocked juries is an “Allen charge,” which is a verdict-urging 
instruction by the trial judge). However, “a trial judge may not coerce jurors into reaching a 
verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969)). This 
supplemental instruction is beyond the scope of this Note. Yet, I would argue that after multiple 
mistrials due to deadlocked juries, using this instruction to encourage jurors to reach a verdict 
cuts against the presumption of innocence and further supports dismissal if, despite such an 
instruction, jurors could still not reach a fair decision.
As of February 8, 2017, Christopher Anderson remained on the long list of “Active Inmates” in 
the Mahoning County Jail. While most of the over 500 inmates currently incarcerated in that 
jail have booking dates listed next to their names that mostly range from the recent years 2015-
2017, with one or two incarcerated since 2010 and 2012, Christopher Anderson’s booking date 
is listed as November 21, 2008. He was sitting in maximum security. See Inmate Information,
MAHONING CTY. SHERIFF’S OFF. (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://mahoningsheriff.com/Inmate/ActiveInmates.pdf
190 As the omnipresent backdrop in this Note, a defendant’s indictment should be dismissed 
with prejudice after hung juries, so the defendant does not have to wait in fear for the State to 
file new charges.
191 State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978).
192 Id. In 2016, in Cincinnati, Ohio, a trial judge declared a mistrial in former police officer 
Ray Tensing’s trial after a jury could not decide if Tensing was guilty of shooting and killing 
Samuel Debose. Perhaps, the use of these factors could have helped Judge Megan Shanahan 
determine whether to dismiss Tensing’s indictment for murder and voluntary manslaughter with 
prejudice. Andy Newman, Jury Deadlocks in Trial of Ex-Officer in Killing of Unarmed Black 
Driver in Cincinnati, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2016, at A31; Sharon Coolidge, Tensing Case Gets 
New Prosecutors, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/tensing/2017/01/13/tensing-case-gets-new-
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among judges and ensure more predictability among cases. Even though these trials 
are very likely to be free of prejudicial error, if the defense can show a few of these 
factors exist during trials following hung juries, the scale would likely tip in favor of
dismissal.193 Both the defense and the prosecution should have the opportunity to try 
to color the factors to support either dismissal or another trial and argue that the factors 
weigh in their favor.
Despite the more specific Double Jeopardy Clause that permits retrials after 
validly declared mistrials, Ohio courts should not easily overlook the Due Course of 
Law Clause, a clause that provides fundamental fairness to the accused and can 
provide more protection to defendants like Anderson.194 Furthermore, during these 
multiple trials, defendants in Ohio are likely to be in jail and suffer lasting 
psychological harms. As defendants sit isolated in post-trial incarceration, they may 
choose to take unfair plea deals. Ultimately, these considerations could also tip the 
scale in favor of dismissal.
Therefore, considering the accused’s right to be free from “legal limbo” and the 
prosecution’s right to seek convictions, if the factors support dismissal, a trial judge 
in Ohio has inherent authority to dismiss the indictment with prejudice to breathe life 
back into a defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence. Even if the government 
is a sore loser, a trial judge needs to respect the integrity of the judicial system and 
remember to promote the proper and prompt administration of justice. A trial judge 
may weigh the factors and ultimately decide to order another trial, but the time has 
come for trial judges in Ohio to more seriously consider when enough is enough 
following multiple mistrials and to know when to throw out the apple when time has 
made it rotten to the core.195
VI. UPDATE
After enduring 5,318 days in jail and unable to stomach a sixth trial, Christopher 
Anderson accepted a plea agreement, pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter and 
aggravated burglary.196 The Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge 
                                                          
prosecutors/96538840/. Factors like these may end up being helpful for Judge Massi in Mercer 
County. In early 2017 in Trenton, Isiah Greene’s second trial, where the State attempted to 
prove that he was guilty of murder, ended in a second mistrial because the jury could not come 
to a conclusion after deliberating for hours. A Mercer County Assistant Prosecutor is leaning 
toward trying the case again. Sulaiman Abdur-Rahman, Isiah Greene’s Second Murder Trial 
Ends in Another Hung Jury, TRENTONIAN (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://trenton.homicidewatch.org/2017/01/31/isiah-greenes-second-murder-trial-ends-in-
another-hung-jury/. 
193 Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 914 (noting that “the trial judge said that the ‘big question’ in his 
opinion was, ‘can this court, or any court ever get a jury that will decide this case in view of the 
past history?’”). Finding a fair and impartial jury that can render a verdict in these complex 
cases, ensuring that witnesses will not be easily impeached by the opposing side because they 
are able to poke holes in the same testimony they heard many times, and preserving hundreds 
of important exhibits, for example, become more and more difficult after each trial ends in a 
mistrial.
194 Sivels v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1197, 1999 (Ind. 2001).
195 Merit Br., supra note 22, at *19–20.
196 Bettman, What Happened on Remand, supra note 1.
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
214 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:181
Anthony D’Apolito sentenced Anderson to time served and five years of post-release 
control.197 After over fourteen years in jail “[e]nough it seems, was enough.”198
After so many years behind bars, causing him to miss out on a child’s marriage 
and the birth of a grandchild, Anderson finally had enough. Though he may finally be 
free from jail, he will now always carry this conviction—on his record for the rest of 
his life—as his family continues to assert his innocence. The sad ending to Anderson’s 
story provides a strong example as to why Ohio trial judges desperately need these 
factors to know whether the time has come to exercise their inherent authority to 
dismiss an indictment with prejudice after multiple mistrials. Utilizing these factors 
will help avoid this detrimental “legal limbo” that caused a man who was jailed for 
almost fifteen years to accept a plea deal simply to avoid enduring yet another trial.
                                                          
197 Id.
198 Id.; see Derek Steyer, Mother of Man Accused of Strangling and Killing an Austintown 
Woman Speaks Out, WFMJ.COM (Mar. 19, 2017), 
http://www.wfmj.com/story/34784793/mother-of-man-accused-of-strangling-and-killing-an-
austintown-woman-speaks-out (“Bogan said her son just wanted to move on with his life. ‘You 
can’t – you can only take so much,’ she said. Despite the guilty plea, Bogan said the real killer 
is still out there. ‘I feel sorry for the family that lost their daughter, but my son didn’t do it,’ she 
said.”).
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